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By specifying model free preferences towards simple nested classes of lottery pairs,
we develop the dual story to stand on equal footing with that of (primal) risk
apportionment. The dual story provides an intuitive interpretation, and full char-
acterization, of dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence and temperance.
The direction of preference between these nested classes of lottery pairs is equiv-
alent to signing the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function
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1 Introduction
Although first received with some skepticism, the notions of prudence and temperance
have now been widely accepted almost on par with the fundamental concept of risk
aversion, at least in an expected utility (EU) framework.
The expanding use of these notions, sometimes termed “higher order risk attitudes”,
can be explained by the fact that they were progressively given a more general interpre-
tation. Consider prudence, for instance. This term was coined by Kimball (1990) in an
influential paper in which he showed that precautionary savings as an optimizing type of
behavior is characterized in an EU framework by a positive third derivative of the utility
function (i.e., “U ′′′ ≥ 0” or “prudence”). However, it is by now well-known that this pos-
itive sign of U ′′′ can be justified more generally outside the specific decision problem of
saving. This more primitive justification of prudence was initiated by Menezes, Geiss and
Tressler (1980), who used the term “downside risk aversion”, and it was further pursued
in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), who also showed how to proceed from prudence to
higher order risk attitudes. These authors first state a “model free” preference, namely
that decision makers (DM’s) like to “combine good with bad” instead of having to face
either everything good or everything bad. Next, this model free preference is shown to
be translated into prudence (U ′′′ ≥ 0) within the EU model, and from prudence—by
defining a sequence of nested lotteries and always asserting the preference for combining
good with bad—the higher order risk attitudes may be obtained similarly, starting with
temperance (U ′′′′ ≤ 0) at the fourth order.
It turns out besides that the simple primitive interpretation of prudence and higher
order risk attitudes found in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) lends itself easily to exper-
imental verification. As a result, there is now an intensive experimental research activity
around the concepts of prudence and temperance in an EU framework (e.g., Ebert and
Wiesen (2011, 2014), Deck and Schlesinger (2010, 2014), and Noussair, Trautmann and
van de Kuilen (2014), to name a few).
The preference for “combining good with bad” has appeared under different names in
the literature. It was called “risk apportionment” in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
A little earlier, Chiu (2005) referred to a “precedence relation”, in which one stochas-
tic dominant change precedes another. The phrase “combining good with bad” as a
primitive trait first appeared in Eeckhoudt, Schlesinger and Tsetlin (2009).
While prudence, temperance, and higher order risk attitudes can be presented initially
as natural properties in a model free environment, their interpretation and implemen-
tation have been developed so far exclusively within an EU framework.1 In this paper,
by specifying new model free preferences towards simple nested classes of lottery pairs,
we develop the dual story to stand on equal footing with that of (primal) risk appor-
tionment. The dual story provides an intuitive interpretation, and full characterization,
of dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence, temperance, and other virtues. We
show that the direction of preference between the nested classes of lottery pairs that
1In very recent work, Baillon (2017) generalizes these interpretations of prudence and higher order
risk attitudes to a setting featuring ambiguity.
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we construct is equivalent to signing the mth derivative of the probability weighting (or
distortion) function within Yaari’s (1979) dual theory (DT), with m an arbitrary posi-
tive integer.2 It turns out that this development requires a fundamental departure from
the approach of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), which, as we will show, is unable to
deliver the desired implications within the DT framework. The dual story we develop
retains generic features of the primal story—e.g., a precedence relation—but crucially
departs from it in its construction and implementation—e.g., by reference to what we
will refer to as “squeezing” and “anti-squeezing” and to the “dual moments”.
This paper thus represents a first step towards a more general interpretation of higher
order risk attitudes within alternative non-EU decision models, such as rank-dependent
utility and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Quiggin (1982), Schmeidler
(1986, 1989), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), for which DT is a building block. Indeed,
because DT is “orthogonal” to EU, our analysis not only reveals the differences with the
primal story under EU, but it is also a prerequisite for a development of higher order
risk attitudes as primitive traits of behavior compatible with the more general models
of choice under risk provided by rank-dependent utility and prospect theory.
A positive sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function is consis-
tent with an “inverse S-shape”, exhibited by the popular probability weighting functions
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (see also Wu and Gonzalez (1996, 1998))
and Prelec (1998) under typical parameter sets implied by experiments.3 These inverse
S-shaped probability weighting functions typically feature a positive sign for the odd
derivatives and an alternating sign (first negative at low wealth levels, then positive at
high wealth levels) for the even derivatives. Provided that the probability weighting
function is first concave and then convex with second derivative equal to zero at the in-
flection point, a positive sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function
implies that the function becomes more concave when moving to the left of the inflection
point and becomes more convex when moving to the right of the inflection point.
As is well-known, primal and dual stochastic dominance coincide up to the second
order and may diverge from the third order onwards. As a by-product, which is of interest
in its own right, the model free story appropriate for DT will nicely make apparent the
fundamental reason behind this divergence.
Our results about the shape of the probability weighting function are relevant for the
analysis of well-known problems in the economics of risk, such as portfolio choice and the
level of self-protection in the presence of background risk. We first illustrate our results
by deriving their implications for optimal portfolio choice with a risky asset, a risk-free
2One may therefore say that this paper constitutes the genuine appropriate dual counterpart of
(primal) risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). Indeed, from a technical perspective,
the contribution of the present paper to the extant literature on (dual or inverse) stochastic ordering in
DT (e.g., Muliere and Scarsini (1989), Wang and Young (1998) and Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Wilthien
(2002)) is similar to the contribution of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) to the literature on (primal)
stochastic ordering in EU (e.g., Whitmore (1970), Ekern (1980) and Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980)).
3The inverse S-shape reflects the psychological notion of diminishing sensitivity (in the domain of
probabilities), which stipulates that DM’s become less (more) sensitive to changes in the objective
probabilities when they move away from (towards) the reference points 0 and 1.
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asset and access to zero-mean financial derivative products on the risky asset. We show
that, contrary to under EU (Gollier (1995)), anmth order improvement of the risky asset’s
return, achieved by supplementing (hence, squeezing) the risky asset with an appropriate
selection of derivative products (e.g., a straddle at the third order or a volatility spread
at the fourth order), never reduces the demand for the risky asset under the DT model.
Furthermore, we show that the third derivative of the probability weighting function
naturally appears in a self-protection problem that trades off the risk of a loss and the
effort of protecting against the loss, in the presence of an independent background risk.
In particular, if the third derivative of the probability weighting function is positive
(“dual prudence”), the background risk stimulates self-protection.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we fix the notation and setting,
introduce some preliminaries for the DT decision model, and provide some basic intu-
ition behind our results. In Section 3, we introduce dual higher order risk attitudes by
developing new model free preferences. Section 4 illustrates implications of our results
for optimal portfolio choice. Section 5 shows that the sign of the third derivative of the
probability weighting function is naturally linked to a self-protection problem. Section
6 contains the formal presentation of our general results. We conclude in Section 7 with
a summary of the results and an indication of potential extensions. Proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.4
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Setting
We represent an n-state lottery A, assigning probabilities pi to final wealth outcomes xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, by A = [ x1, p1 ; . . . ; xn, pn ]. We always assume that states are ordered
according to their associated outcomes, from the lowest outcome state to the highest
outcome state. Outcomes are assumed to be non-negative. That is, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn.
With each lottery, generating a probability distribution over outcomes, one can associate
a random variable. Henceforth, the lottery and its associated random variable are often
identified. We write P [A ≤ x] = FA(x) = 1 − SA(x), with FA and SA the cumulative
and decumulative distribution functions of A, respectively. Furthermore, we denote by
 a (weak) preference relation over lotteries.
Under Yaari’s (1987) dual theory (DT), the evaluation V of the n-state lottery A is
4Some supplementary material, including two illustrations and some technical details to supplement
Section 2.2, some further details to supplement Section 5, and some technical details to supplement the
Appendix, suppressed in this version to save space, is contained in the extended online version of this
paper that is available from the authors’ webpages (see http://www.rogerlaeven.com).
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given by
V [A] =
∫ ∞
0
x dh(FA(x))
=
n∑
i=1
xi (h(FA(xi))− h(FA(xi−1))) , (2.1)
with x0 = 0 and FA(x0) = 0 by convention, and with h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying h(0) =
0, h(1) = 1, and h′ ≥ 0, a probability weighting (or distortion) function, henceforth
assumed to be differentiable for all degrees of differentiation on (0, 1).5 We sometimes
denote by h(m) the mth derivative of h.6
We say that a lottery B dominates a lottery A in third-degree dual (or inverse)
stochastic dominance order if
E [A] ≤ E [B] , E [min(A1, A2)] ≤ E [min(B1, B2)] , and 3F−1A ≤ 3F−1B .
Here, A1 (B1) and A2 (B2) are two independent draws from lottery A (B). Furthermore,
m+1F−1A (q) =
∫ q
0
mF−1A (p) dp, m = 1, 2, . . ., 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, with 1F−1A ≡ F−1A , and inequalities
between functions are understood pointwise. We refer to E [min(A1, A2, . . . , Am)] as the
mth “dual moment” of A.7 In full generality, we say that lottery B dominates lottery A
5In the literature, following Yaari (1987), the evaluation under DT is often carried out by distorting
the decumulative distribution function SA instead of the cumulative distribution function FA as in (2.1).
Notice, however, that
V [A] =
∫ ∞
0
xdh(FA(x)) =
∫ ∞
0
x d
(
1− h¯(SA(x))
)
=
∫ ∞
0
h¯(SA(x)) dx,
with h¯(p) := 1 − h(1 − p), mapping the unit interval onto itself and satisfying h¯(0) = 0, h¯(1) = 1,
and h¯′ ≥ 0, and that positive signs of the higher order derivatives of h¯ are equivalent to alternating
signs of the higher order derivatives of h. In particular, concavity of h translates to convexity of h¯. To
be consistent with the alternating signs of the derivatives of the utility function in the EU model, we
define the evaluation V under DT by distorting the cumulative distribution function FA rather than the
decumulative distribution function SA. Thus, in our setting a concave probability weighting function h
is equivalent to “strong” risk aversion in the sense of aversion to mean preserving spreads (Chew, Karni
and Safra (1987) and Roe¨ll (1987)), and, more generally, the higher order derivatives of the probability
weighting function h will naturally alternate in sign, just like that of U .
6We use the notations h′, h′′, . . . and h(1), h(2), . . . interchangeably.
7In statistics, these moments are sometimes referred to as mean (first) order statistics. They measure
the expected worst outcome in an experiment with repeated independent draws; see also David (1981).
Primal moments occur under EU when considering power functions as utility functions. Similarly, dual
moments occur under DT when considering power functions as probability weighting functions:
E [min(A1, A2, . . . , Am)] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− FA(x))m dx =
∫ ∞
0
h¯(1− FA(x)) dx =
∫ ∞
0
xdh(FA(x))
= V [A],
with h¯(p) = pm and h¯(p) = 1 − h(1 − p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Observe that the power probability weighting
function satisfies h¯′′ ≥ 0, hence h′′ ≤ 0.
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in mth-degree dual stochastic dominance order (m = 2, 3, . . .) if
E [A] ≤ E [B] , E [min(A1, A2)] ≤ E [min(B1, B2)] , . . . ,
E [min(A1, A2, . . . , Am−1)] ≤ E [min(B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1)] , and mF−1A ≤ mF−1B .
Preferences for mth order dual stochastic dominance, with first (m − 1) dual moments
equal, are well-known to be linked to the sign of the mth derivative of the probability
weighting function within DT (Muliere and Scarsini (1989)), just like primal stochastic
dominance orders are connected to the successive derivatives of the utility function under
EU (Ekern (1980)). For further details on dual (inverse) stochastic dominance, we refer
e.g., to De La Cal and Ca´rcamo (2010) and the references therein.
Under EU the sign of the mth derivative of the utility function can be interpreted by
comparing simple nested pairs of lotteries with equal (m− 1) primal moments, obtained
via the apportionment of harms (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). To interpret the
sign of the mth derivative of the probability weighting function under DT, we develop
simple nested lottery pairs that have equal (m− 1) dual moments.
2.2 Illustration and Intuition
Since it is well-known that EU and DT agree at the first and second orders in their
evaluation of a sure reduction in wealth and a mean preserving spread (see Yaari (1986),
Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), Roe¨ll (1987) and Muliere and Scarsini (1989)) we develop
here a numerical example to illustrate that they may diverge at the third order. This
example builds the intuition behind the reason why EU and DT may diverge at the third
order and motivates the adjustments that have to be made to the story of “combining
good with bad” used to interpret the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility
function under EU. While it is known that third order primal and dual stochastic domi-
nance do not in general coincide (see Muliere and Scarsini (1989) and its references), we
illustrate their potential divergence here in the context of (primal) risk apportionment
(Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)).8
We start from an initial lottery I given by
I = [ 2, 1/2 ; 3, 1/2 ],
and, invoking (primal) risk apportionment, “add” the independent zero-mean risk ε˜ given
by
ε˜ = [ −2, 1/3 ; 1, 2/3 ],
to one of the states of I. If ε˜ is added to the first state of I (which is the bad one) we
generate a lottery A given by
A = [ 0, 1/6 ; 3, 5/6 ],
8In this context, similarly, EU and DT may agree at the third order, such as in their evaluation of
the specific case of Mao’s (1970) lotteries considered also by Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980) (see
the extended online version), or may not agree, such as in the example presented in this section.
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while if it is added to the second state (which is the good one) we generate a lottery B
given by
B = [ 1, 1/6 ; 2, 1/2 ; 4, 1/3 ].
From Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), we know that under EU, U ′′′ ≥ 0 implies
B  A.9 If the DM has a quadratic utility (hence, “U ′′′ = 0” or “zero prudence”) he is
indifferent between A and B.
Now consider a DM under the DT model with a quadratic probability weighting
function:
h(p) = αp− βp2,
with α = 1 + β and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 so that h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1 and h is non-decreasing and
concave.10 This DM has “zero dual prudence” (“h′′′ = 0”). Simple computations reveal
that for this DM, V [A] ≥ V [B] with strict inequality whenever β > 0 (hence, h′′ < 0).
Thus, there is a difference of opinions between the EU DM, who is indifferent between
A and B under zero primal prudence, and the DT DM, who prefers A over B under zero
dual prudence.
The divergence of opinions between these two DM’s can be related to a difference
between the primal and dual moments of A and B. Clearly, A and B have the first
two primal moments (mean and variance) in common. Their second dual moments are,
however, different.11
It thus appears that the model free prescription that favors “combining good with
bad” in the particular way as suggested by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) leads to
an interpretation of the signs of the successive derivatives of U within the EU model;
however, this model free principle does not always generate a similar interpretation for
the signs of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function under the
DT framework. Thus, if one desires to obtain for DT and the signs of the successive
derivatives of the probability weighting function a development that parallels that within
EU, one has to modify the initial model free preferences. This is the purpose of the next
section.
3 Model Free Preferences
To provide an intuitive interpretation to the signs of the successive derivatives of the
probability weighting function beyond the second order12 we now develop the appropriate
9Lottery B is obtained from lottery I by adding the bad risk ε˜ (bad since ε˜ is second order stochas-
tically dominated by 0) to the good state of I while the converse is true for A. One might alternatively
say that in A the bad (ε˜) precedes the good (0). Conversely, in B the good (0) precedes the bad (ε˜).
10Note that h(0) = 0 by definition. Furthermore, to have h(1) = 1, α − β = 1 should hold. Hence,
h(p) = (1 + β)p − βp2, so that h′(p) = 1 + β − 2βp. To have h′(1) ≥ 0 (hence h′(p) ≥ 0 whenever
h′′(p) ≤ 0), β ≤ 1 should hold. Finally, h′′(p) = −2β so h′′ ≤ 0 if β ≥ 0. In sum, α = 1 + β and
0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
11Indeed, E [min(A1, A2)] = 25/12 while E [min(B1, B2)] = 23/12.
12As is well-known, both U ′′ ≤ 0 and h′′ ≤ 0 correspond to strong risk aversion (i.e., aversion to mean
preserving spreads); see the references in Section 2.2.
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model free preferences. We will continue to assert that DM’s want to combine good with
bad. In Chiu’s (2005) equivalent terminology, the DM still satisfies a precedence relation.
He favors that the good precedes the bad. However, our definition of good and bad will
be based on the concepts of “squeezing” and “anti-squeezing” a distribution instead of
adding zero-mean risks and zero with certainty as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
Squeezing and anti-squeezing will serve as the main building blocks in our approach.
The sequence of squeezes and anti-squeezes that we develop will preserve dual rather
than primal moments.
Squeezing occurs when we transform an initial lottery
L = [ x1, p1 ; . . . ; xi, pi + p ; . . . ; xj, pj + p ; . . . ; xn, pn ],
with pk ≥ 0 (where equality to zero is explicitly permitted), k = 1, . . . , n, and p > 0,
into a lottery D given by
D = [ x1, p1 ; . . . ; xi, pi ; xi + x, p ; . . . ; xj − x, p ; xj, pj ; . . . ; xn, pn ],
with x > 0. Anti-squeezing occurs when x is replaced by −x, that is, when L is trans-
formed into a lottery C given by
C = [ x1, p1 ; . . . ; xi − x, pi ; xi, p ; . . . ; xj, p ; xj + x, pj ; . . . ; xn, pn ].
Clearly, both squeezing and anti-squeezing preserve the mean. Note the generality of
these transformations. Depending on the specification of x and p, a squeeze and an anti-
squeeze can be interpreted both as a shift in outcomes and as a shift in probabilities.
In this section, we explicate the dual story in examples. Section 6 contains the general
approach. We first return to the second order and consider an initial lottery L(2) given
by13
L(2) = [ 1, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2 ].
Now we transform the lottery L(2) into a lottery D(2) by squeezing. Specifically, we
“attach” (state-wise with the state probabilities matched)
G(2) = [ x, p ] and B(2) = [ −x, p ],
to L(2), where in this case we let p = 1/n, n = 2, and where x = 1/M , M ≥ 2.14 We
assume the good (G(2)) precedes the bad (B(2)). This squeeze yields the new lottery D(2)
given by
D(2) = [ 1 + 1/M, 1/2 ; 2− 1/M, 1/2 ].
Of course, an anti-squeeze of L(2) that is same-sized but opposite to the squeeze, achieved
by attaching B(2) and G(2) state-wise with the bad now preceding the good, would gen-
erate C(2) given by
C(2) = [ 1− 1/M, 1/2 ; 2 + 1/M, 1/2 ].
13The superscript (2) refers to “second order” and more generally the superscript (m) refers to “mth
order”.
14The condition on M guarantees that the squeeze does not change the initial ranking of outcomes.
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Figure 1: Squeezing and Anti-Squeezing at the Second Order
This figure plots the transformation from L(2) to D(2) (left panel) and from L(2) to C(2) (right panel),
with x1 = 1, x2 = 2, and p = 1/2. G(3) and B(3) will be used to develop the dual story at the third
order.
p x1 + G(2)
p
x2 + B(2)
+G(3)
(a.) Second order: Good precedes bad
p x1 + B(2)
p
x2 + G(2)
+B(3)
(b.) Second order: Bad precedes good
See the illustration in Figure 1.
Clearly, under strong risk aversion, D(2)  C(2).15 These preferences correspond
to h′′ ≤ 0 under DT and to U ′′ ≤ 0 under the EU model. Indeed, squeezing and
anti-squeezing are special cases of a mean preserving contraction and a mean preserving
spread in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and DT and EU are known to agree
in their evaluation of a mean preserving contraction and a mean preserving spread.
Turning now to the third order, the agreement between DT and EU may collapse, as
already anticipated in Section 2.2. The model free preferences based on the precedence
relation towards good and bad coupled with the notions of squeezing and anti-squeezing
are deployed as follows.16 We start from an initial lottery L(3) given by
L(3) = [ 1, 1/3 ; 2, 1/3 ; 4, 1/3 ].
Then we generate D(3) as
D(3) = [ 1 + 1/M, 1/3 ; 2− 2/M, 1/3 ; 4 + 1/M, 1/3 ],
with M ≥ 3. To obtain D(3) from L(3), we first transform the worst two states of L(3) by
applying a squeeze, attaching
G(3) = [ x, p ; −x, p ],
where we take in this case p = 1/n, n = 3, and x = 1/M , M ≥ 3. Then on the best two
states of L(3) we perform an anti-squeeze, achieved by attaching
B(3) = [ −x, p ; x, p ],
15For reasons that become apparent in Section 6 we don’t compare the changed lotteries C(2) and D(2)
to the initial lottery L(2) they are generated from, although this comparison is straightforward in this
particular case, in which D(2)  L(2)  C(2). In fact, throughout this section, D(m)  L(m)  C(m),
m = 2, 3, 4, for DT DM’s having probability weighting functions with higher order derivatives that
alternate in sign. For brevity, we sometimes directly construct D(m) from C(m) in the following sections.
16This is again an illustration. The general treatment is contained in Section 6.
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Figure 2: Squeezing and Anti-Squeezing Sequences at the Third Order
This figure plots the transformation from L(3) to D(3) (left panel) and from L(3) to C(3) (right panel),
with x1 = 1, x2 = 2, x3 = 4, and p = 1/3. G(4) and B(4) will be used to develop the dual story at the
fourth order.
p x1
p
x2
p x3
+G(3)
+B(3)
+G(4)
(a.) Third order: Good precedes bad
p x1
p
x2
p x3
+B(3)
+G(3)
+B(4)
(b.) Third order: Bad precedes good
with p = 1/n, n = 3, and x = 1/M , M ≥ 3. In the transformation from L(3) to
D(3), the good (G(3)) precedes the bad (B(3)). To keep the required number of states as
small as possible, for ease and parsimony of exposition, we consider in this illustration
a lottery L(3) with only 3 states, having moreover equal probabilities of occurrence, and
we squeeze and anti-squeeze at an overlapping state (that with outcome 2) and by the
same amount. These restrictions are, however, not required for our general approach;
see Section 6 for further details.
Similarly, we generate a lottery C(3) given by
C(3) = [ 1− 1/M, 1/3 ; 2 + 2/M, 1/3 ; 4− 1/M, 1/3 ],
obtained from the initial lottery L(3) by letting the bad, B(3), precede the good, G(3). See
the illustration in Figure 2.
As shown in Section 6, to which a precise statement of this result is deferred—see
Theorems 6.1 and 6.2—, “dual prudence” (or “h′′′ ≥ 0”) corresponds to “D(3)  C(3)”.
Both the well-known probability weighting function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
and that of Prelec (1998) exhibit h′′′ ≥ 0 under the typical parameter sets implied by
experiments.
It is very important to realize that there is no unanimity among EU maximizers
with U ′′′ ≥ 0 on the comparison between C(3) and D(3). This is essentially so because
these two lotteries with the same mean have different variances and skewnesses. Indeed,
Var[D(3)] > Var[C(3)] and Skew[D(3)] > Skew[C(3)]. As a result, EU DM’s who are
relatively more (less) risk averse than prudent prefer C(3) (D(3)). While our story of
squeezing and anti-squeezing may yield different primal moments (variances in particu-
lar) for the lotteries that are compared, it preserves equality of the second dual moments.
Indeed, one may verify that
E
[
min(D
(3)
1 , D
(3)
2 )
]
= E
[
min(C
(3)
1 , C
(3)
2 )
]
.
This is the fundamental reason why EU and DT may diverge from the third order
onwards.
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We note that if we would have started from an initial lottery L˜(3) given by
L˜(3) = [ 1, 1/3 ; 2, 1/3 ; 3, 1/3 ],
equality of the variances would have been preserved in the transformation to the corre-
sponding D˜(3) and C˜(3). In this case both EU DM’s with U ′′′ ≥ 0 and DT DM’s with
h′′′ ≥ 0 would have preferred D˜(3) over C˜(3). That is, EU and DT may, but need not,
diverge at the third order.
In order to interpret the sign of the fourth derivative of h we start from an expanded
lottery L(4) given by
L(4) = [ 1, 1/4 ; 2, 1/4 ; 4, 1/4 ; 7, 1/4 ].
Now on the worst three states of L(4) we conduct the beneficial transformation described
at the third order (i.e., that with G(3) preceding B(3)), attaching
G(4) = [ x, p ; −2x, p ; x, p ],
with in this case p = 1/n, n = 4, and x = 1/M , M ≥ 4. Next, on the best three states
of L(4) we conduct exactly the opposite transformation, by attaching
B(4) = [ −x, p ; 2x, p ; −x, p ],
so that we obtain a lottery D(4) given by
D(4) = [ 1 + 1/M, 1/4 ; 2− 3/M, 1/4 ; 4 + 3/M, 1/4 ; 7− 1/M, 1/4 ].
Conversely, by letting the bad precede the good we generate
C(4) = [ 1− 1/M, 1/4 ; 2 + 3/M, 1/4 ; 4− 3/M, 1/4 ; 7 + 1/M, 1/4 ].
In Section 6, we show that D(4) is unanimously preferred over C(4) by DT DM’s with
“dual temperance” (or “h′′′′ ≤ 0”)—see Theorems 6.3 and 6.4.
To see the implications of the dual story within the EU model, it is convenient to
compare D(4) to C(4) when M = 4. While in this case C(4) and D(4) have the same mean
and variance, one easily verifies that D(4) has both a smaller skewness and a smaller
kurtosis than C(4). Hence, there cannot be unanimity among the prudent and temperate
EU DM’s about the appreciation of the two lotteries: some will prefer D(4) while others
will prefer C(4), depending upon their relative degrees of prudence and temperance. This
observation makes explicit the reason why at the fourth order EU and DT may (continue
to) diverge: while the sequence of squeezing and anti-squeezing at the fourth order may
produce different third primal moments for C(4) and D(4), it preserves the equality of
the third dual moments, corroborating again their relevance for the dual story.
We finally note that the lotteries at the third and fourth orders are generated by
simple iterations of the transformations relevant at the second and third orders, respec-
tively. Hence, this analysis can be pursued up to arbitrary order to interpret the signs
of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function. We thus obtain, as
in the Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) approach, a sequence of simple nested lotteries
that yield now the appropriate interpretation of the signs of h(m).
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4 Portfolio Choice with Derivatives
Consider a DT investor with initial sure wealth w0. Suppose that he allocates an amount
α to a risky asset (the “stock”) and an amount w0−α to a risk-free asset (the “bond”).
The bond (stock) earns a sure (risky) return of r (R) per unit invested. Assume that
r and R are independent of the amounts invested. The investor aims to determine the
optimal amount α∗. Because (w0−α)(1 + r) +α(1 +R) = w0(1 + r) +α(R− r) and the
DT evaluation is translation invariant and positively homogeneous, his problem reads:
arg maxα{α(V [R]− r)}. (4.1)
We add the constraint 0 ≤ α ≤ w0. It readily follows that the optimal solution α∗ is a
corner solution.
Suppose V [R] < r. Then the optimal solution is α∗ = 0. In this case, the investor
fully invests in the bond. Now imagine that the investor is offered an improvement
to the distribution of the risky return. In particular, he is offered the possibility of
supplementing the stock with derivative products on the stock that have zero expected
value at zero cost. The derivative products are selected by applying the dual story such
that they induce, through squeezing and anti-squeezing, an mth order improvement of R,
with m ≥ 2. The return of the risky portfolio of stock and derivatives jointly is denoted
by R¯. (We provide details on the derivative products shortly.)
Then two cases are possible: (i) If V [R¯] ≤ r, full investment in the bond remains
optimal. (ii) If the improvement is sufficiently large so that V [R¯] > r, the DT investor
will shift from one corner solution (full investment in the bond, i.e., α∗ = 0) to the other
corner solution (full investment in the risky portfolio, i.e., α∗ = w0).
To illustrate these mth order improvements, suppose for ease of exposition that r ≡ 0.
Consider the second order first. Assume that the stock price takes the values 1 and 3
each with probability 1/2. Invoking the dual story, we find that a long position in a put
option combined with a short position in a call option, each with a strike price of 2 such
that the joint expected value is zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio (R¯
versus R) whenever h′′ ≤ 0. Indeed, the difference between R¯ and R can in this case be
seen as the result of squeezing and anti-squeezing.17 As visualized in the top left panel
of Figure 3, this combination of long put and short call provides a hedge against adverse
stock scenarios, which is financed by giving up upward potential.
17Throughout this section the risky stock price S0(1 + R), with S0 the initial stock price, plays
the role of the lotteries C(m) encountered in the dual story, while the stock-and-derivatives portfolio
price S0(1 + R¯) plays the role of the lotteries D
(m). The derivative supplements directly generate the
improvement R¯ from R. Specifically, R = (C(m) − S0)/S0 and R¯ = (D(m) − S0)/S0. At the second
order,
C(2) = [ 1, 1/2 ; 3, 1/2 ] and D(2) = [ 2, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2 ].
Of course, C(2) and D(2) may be generated from a common initial lottery L(2) = [ 3/2, 1/2 ; 5/2, 1/2 ]
by squeezing and anti-squeezing, that is, by attaching
G(2) = [ 1/2, 1/2 ] and B(2) = [ −1/2, 1/2 ],
to L(2). If the good (bad) precedes the bad (good), D(2) (C(2)) is generated.
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Next, consider the third order. Assume now that the stock price takes the values
{1, 3, 5, 7} each with probability 1/4. Then, deploying the dual story, one may readily
verify that a so-called “straddle” option at stock price 4 such that the expected value is
zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio (R¯ versus R) whenever h′′′ ≥ 0.
As visualized in the top right panel of Figure 3, the straddle pays off in bad stock scenar-
ios and in good stock scenarios, but generates losses in intermediate stock scenarios.18
Because the straddle increases not only the skewness but also the variance of the risky
portfolio, there would be no unanimity for the straddle supplement under EU, contrary
to under DT.
Finally, at the fourth order, assume that the stock price takes the values {1, 3, 5, 7,
9, 11, 13, 15} each with probability 1/8. Then, the dual story implies that a long straddle
at stock price 4 combined with a short straddle at stock price 12, with joint expected
value equal zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio provided h′′′′ ≤ 0.
This combination of a long and short straddle, visualized in the last panel of Figure 3,
is a popular and simple case of a so-called “volatility spread”.19
We thus find that an mth order (dual) improvement of the risky asset’s return dis-
tribution never reduces the demand for the risky asset when the successive derivatives
of the probability weighting function alternate in sign. This stands in sharp contrast
to the familiar results under EU, where an mth order (primal) improvement of R has
ambiguous demand effects, even for m ≥ 1. Indeed, to obtain the natural result that
such improvements induce a higher demand for the risky asset under EU, additional non-
trivial conditions need to be imposed (see Section 9.3 of Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995)
and Gollier (1995) for details).20
5 Self-Protection with Background Risk
In this section, we consider a DT DM with initial sure wealth w0 who faces the risk of
losing the monetary amount ` > 0. The probability of occurrence of the loss, p, depends
on the self-protection21 effort, e, exerted by the DM. In particular, p(e) is decreasing in
e. Effort is measured in monetary equivalents. The DM aims to determine the optimal
level of effort e∗ that maximizes his DT evaluation.
We analyze this problem in the presence of an independent background risk. This
background risk may e.g., be due to the risk of holding risky financial assets or to
18At the third order, R = (C(3) − S0)/S0 and R¯ = (D(3) − S0)/S0, where
C(3) = [ 1, 1/4 ; 3, 1/4 ; 5, 1/4 ; 7, 1/4 ] and D(3) = [ 2, 1/4 ; 2, 1/4 ; 4, 1/4 ; 8, 1/4 ].
They can be generated from an initial lottery L(3) = [ 3/2, 1/4 ; 5/2, 1/4 ; 9/2, 1/4 ; 15/2, 1/4 ] by
attaching
G(3) = [ 1/2, 1/4 ; −1/2, 1/4 ] and B(3) = [ −1/2, 1/4 ; 1/2, 1/4 ],
at non-overlapping states.
19The payoffs of the long and short straddle are digitally set to 0 at stock price 8 for simplicity.
20See also the analysis of Dittmar (2002) in the EU model.
21Adopting the terminology of Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
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uncertain labor income. The sign of h′′′ appears to play an essential role in this self-
protection problem with background risk. Hence, while under EU the a priori validity
of U ′′′ ≥ 0 is connected to a savings decision (Kimball (1990)), we show that under DT
the a priori validity of h′′′ ≥ 0 may be linked to a self-protection problem.
With an independent binary background risk taking the value ±ε, ε > 0, each with
probability 1/2, the self-protection problem can be represented by the following 4-state
lottery S(e):
S(e) = [ w0 − `− ε− e, p(e)/2 ; w0 − `+ ε− e, p(e)/2 ;
w0 − ε− e, (1− p(e))/2 ; w0 + ε− e, (1− p(e))/2 ],
assuming 2ε < `. If 2ε > `, the middle two states of S change places. The DT DM
solves:
arg maxe{V [S(e)]}. (5.1)
We assume throughout that V is concave in e.
If 2ε < `, the first-order condition for optimality reads
V [S(e)]
de
= (p′(e)/2)h′(p(e)/2) ((w0 − `− ε− e)− (w0 − `+ ε− e))
+ p′(e)h′(p(e)) ((w0 − `+ ε− e)− (w0 − ε− e))
+ (p′(e)/2)h′((1 + p(e))/2) ((w0 − ε− e)− (w0 + ε− e))
− 1 = 0.
After obvious simplifications, we obtain
p′(e)ε (−h′(p(e)/2) + 2h′(p(e))− h′((1 + p(e))/2))− p′(e)h′(p(e))`− 1 = 0. (5.2)
We note that in the absence of any background risk, i.e., when ε = 0, the first-order
condition reduces to
− p′(e)h′(p(e))`− 1 = 0. (5.3)
Now assume first, like in Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) for EU, that −p′(e)h′(p(e))`−1 =
0 when p(e) = 1/2. This means that the DT DM optimally selects an effort level e such
that the probability of the occurrence of a loss is 1/2, in the absence of background risk.
Under this assumption, we find from (5.2) that the impact of the background risk is
linked to the sign of
− h′(1/4) + 2h′(1/2)− h′(3/4) = (h′(1/2)− h′(1/4))− (h′(3/4)− h′(1/2)) . (5.4)
If the sign of h′′′ is positive, then (5.4) is negative, and note that p′(e)ε is negative, too.
Therefore, and in view of the concavity of V with respect to e, the introduction of a
background risk in this setting stimulates self-protection provided the DT DM is dual
prudent.
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Next, consider the case 2ε > `. In this case, the first-order condition is
dV [S(e)]
de
= (p′(e)/2)h′(p(e)/2) ((w0 − `− ε− e)− (w0 − ε− e))
+ (p′(e)/2)h′((1 + p(e))/2) ((w0 − `+ ε− e)− (w0 + ε− e))
− 1 = 0,
which, after obvious simplifications, reduces to
− (1/2)p′(e)` (h′(p(e)/2) + h′((1 + p(e))/2))− 1 = 0. (5.5)
Recall that in the absence of any background risk, the first-order condition equals (5.3).
Hence, noting that the difference between the left-hand side of (5.5) and the left-hand
side of (5.3) equals
−(1/2)p′(e)` (h′(p(e)/2)− 2h′(p(e)) + h′((1 + p(e))/2)) , (5.6)
and maintaining the assumption that −p′(e)h′(p(e))`− 1 = 0 when p(e) = 1/2, we find
that the impact of the background risk is again linked to the sign of (5.4) which, in turn,
depends on the sign of h′′′.
Thus, under the maintained assumption that−p′(e)h′(p(e))`−1 = 0 when p(e) = 1/2,
h′′′ ≥ 0 guarantees that the marginal benefit of self-protection increases upon the intro-
duction of an independent background risk. Therefore, the background risk stimulates
self-protection under dual prudence.22
By a similar analysis, we can extend the results to a larger set of possible cases.23
If −p′(e)h′(p(e))` − 1 = 0 when p(e) ≤ 1/2, we find that dual imprudent DM’s (i.e.,
h′′′ ≤ 0) exert less effort with background risk than without. If −p′(e)h′(p(e))`− 1 = 0
when p(e) ≥ 1/2, we obtain that dual prudent DM’s (i.e., h′′′ ≥ 0) exert more effort with
background risk than without.
6 Dual Risk Apportionment
In this section, we develop the dual story as illustrated in Section 3 in full generality.
Throughout this section we consider n-state lotteries and assume all states to have equal
probability of occurrence 1/n, n ∈ N. We permit that the increments in the outcomes
when moving to an adjacent state are equal to zero. This can be interpreted to yield
lotteries with unequal state probabilities.
22There is a difference between the two cases. When 2ε < `, the convexity of h′ adds a marginal
benefit that depends on the size of ε compared to the situation of no background risk; cf. (5.2). When
2ε > `, the convexity of h′ adds a marginal benefit that is independent of ε but depends on the size of
` compared to the situation of no background risk; cf. (5.6).
23See the extended online version for further details.
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6.1 The Third Order: Dual Prudence
We start by providing a simple class of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference
between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the third derivative of the probability
weighting function under DT. Consider
G(3) = [ δ, 1/n ; . . . ; −δ, 1/n ] and B(3) = [ −δ′, 1/n ; . . . ; δ′, 1/n ],
with δ, δ′ ≥ 0. The acronyms “G” and “B” refer to “good” and “bad”. Upon “attaching”
G(3) and B(3) state-wise to an arbitrarily given initial lottery that has at least three states
such that the state-wise addition is feasible, we generate D(3) if G(3) state-wise precedes
B(3) and we generate C(3) if B(3) state-wise precedes G(3). Attaching the good, G(3),
induces a squeeze, while attaching the bad, B(3), induces an anti-squeeze.
To emphasize the generality of these transformations, we note that: (i) δ and δ′ may
differ; (ii) the number of states that “. . .” denotes in G(3) and in B(3) may differ; (iii)
the number of states that “. . .” denotes in G(3) and in B(3) may be equal to zero; (iv)
the spacing (i.e., the number of states) between G(3) and B(3) on the one hand and B(3)
and G(3) on the other hand when attaching them to the initial lottery may differ; (v)
this spacing may be negative, so that the good and the bad partially overlap, but G(3)
strictly precedes B(3) by at least one state for D(3) and B(3) strictly precedes G(3) by
at least one state for C(3). All these generalities are permitted as long as the ranking
of outcomes remains unaffected by the squeezes and anti-squeezes and the outcomes of
the resulting lotteries remain non-negative. These generalities are in part thanks to the
fact that we don’t compare the changed lotteries to the initial lottery they are generated
from. Rather we compare two altered lotteries: one has the good precede the bad, the
other the reverse.
We say that an individual is “dual prudent” if, for any such lottery pair (C(3), D(3)),
he prefers D(3) to C(3). The following theorem shows that within DT this is guaranteed
by a positive sign of h′′′. The individual’s type of behavior corresponding to these
lottery preferences, and their higher-order generalizations that we develop below, may
be termed “dual risk apportionment”. Much like under primal risk apportionment, the
apportionment of harms within a lottery mitigates the detrimental effects for such an
individual.
Theorem 6.1 If C(3) and D(3) are generated by the transformations described above,
then D(3) is preferred (dispreferred) to C(3) by any DT DM with h′′′ ≥ 0 (h′′′ ≤ 0).
In the remainder of this subsection, we consider a parsimonious subclass of lottery
pairs C(3) and D(3) that turns out to be already sufficient for the purpose of signing h′′′.
Let n ≥ 3 and consider
C(3)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1,1/n ; xj+2,1/n ; xj+3,1/n ;
xj+4, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ].
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The three states in bold need to be present for any given n(≥ 3), the remaining states
are added arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the
outcomes when moving to an adjacent higher state of C
(3)
n are allowed to be arbitrarily
non-negative and state-dependent, as long as the squeezes and anti-squeezes performed
below do not change the ranking of outcomes.24
Then, we (directly) construct D
(3)
n from C
(3)
n by attaching to the three states in bold
C2D(3)n = [ 1/M, 1/n ; −2/M, 1/n ; 1/M, 1/n ].
This yields D
(3)
n given by
D(3)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1 + 1/M,1/n ; xj+2 − 2/M,1/n ; xj+3 + 1/M,1/n ;
xj+4, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ].
Clearly, C
(3)
n and D
(3)
n occur as a subclass of C(3) and D(3). To see this, consider an
initial lottery L
(3)
n given by
L(3)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1 + 1/(2M),1/n ; xj+2 − 1/M,1/n ; xj+3 + 1/(2M),1/n ;
xj+4, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ],
and generate D
(3)
n (C
(3)
n ) by attaching the good (bad), G(3) (B(3)), given by
G(3) = [ 1/(2M), 1/n ; −1/(2M), 1/n ] and B(3) = [ −1/(2M), 1/n ; 1/(2M), 1/n ],
to the first two bold states of L
(3)
n , and attaching the bad (good), B(3) (G(3)), to the last
two bold states of L
(3)
n . To keep the required number of states as small as possible and
enhance parsimony, sufficient for our purpose of signing h′′′, we squeeze and anti-squeeze
at an overlapping state, just like in Section 3.
The following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class of
lottery pairs D
(3)
n and C
(3)
n signs h′′′:
Theorem 6.2 If, for any n ≥ 3, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) D(3)n to C(3)n , then h′′′ ≥ 0
(h′′′ ≤ 0).
6.2 The Fourth Order: Dual Temperance
Next, we provide a simple class of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference
between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the fourth derivative of the probability
weighting function under DT. Consider
G(4) = [ δ, 1/n ; . . . ; −δ, 1/n ; . . . ; −δ, 1/n ; . . . ; δ, 1/n ] and
B(4) = [ −δ′, 1/n ; . . . ; δ′, 1/n ; . . . ; δ′, 1/n ; . . . ; −δ′, 1/n ],
24This is accomplished by restrictingM in the squeezes and anti-squeezes explicated below accordingly.
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with δ, δ′ ≥ 0. Upon attaching G(4) and B(4) to an arbitrarily given initial lottery that
has at least four states such that the state-wise addition is feasible, we generate D(4) if
G(4) state-wise precedes B(4) and we generate C(4) if B(4) state-wise precedes G(4). We
note that G(4) and B(4) can each be interpreted as simple concatenations of same-sized
but exactly opposite G(3) and B(3). Thus, we define the fourth order transformations by
simple iterations of the third order ones.
To emphasize the generality of these transformations, we note that: (i) δ and δ′ may
differ; (ii) the number of states that “. . .” denotes may differ within and between G(4)
and B(4), but both G(4) and B(4) need to be symmetrical in the sense that the first and
third “. . .” within G(4) denote the same number of states and similarly for B(4) (which
is compatible with G(4) and B(4) each being concatenations of same-sized but exactly
opposite G(3) and B(3)); (iii) the number of states that the first and third “. . .” denote
in G(4) and B(4) is non-negative and may be equal to zero, while the number of states
that the middle (second) “. . .” denotes is larger than or equal to minus one;25 (iv) the
spacing (i.e., the number of states) between G(4) and B(4) on the one hand and B(4) and
G(4) on the other hand when attaching them to the initial lottery may differ; (v) this
spacing may be negative, so that the good and the bad partially overlap, but G(4) strictly
precedes B(4) by at least one state for D(4) and B(4) strictly precedes G(4) by at least one
state for C(4). All these generalities are permitted as long as the ranking of outcomes
remains unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative.
We say that an individual is “dual temperate” if, for any such lottery pair (C(4), D(4)),
he prefers D(4) to C(4). The following theorem shows that within DT this is guaranteed
by a negative sign of h′′′′.
Theorem 6.3 If C(4) and D(4) are generated by the transformations described above,
then D(4) is preferred (dispreferred) to C(4) by any DT DM with h′′′′ ≤ 0 (h′′′′ ≥ 0).
As in Section 6.1, let us in the remainder of this subsection consider a parsimonious
subclass of lottery pairs C(4) and D(4), already sufficient for our purpose of signing h′′′′.
Let n ≥ 4 and consider
C(4)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1,1/n ; xj+2,1/n ; xj+3,1/n ; xj+4,1/n ;
xj+5, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ].
The four states in bold need to be present for any given n(≥ 4), the remaining states
are added arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the
outcomes when moving to an adjacent higher state of C
(4)
n are again allowed to be
arbitrarily non-negative and state-dependent, as long as the transformations conducted
below do not change the ranking of outcomes.26
25If the number of states that “. . .” represents is -1, the middle two adjacent states overlap, thus
attaching −2δ for G(4) and 2δ′ for B(4) to a state with probability 1/n.
26This is accomplished by restricting M in the transformations explicated below accordingly.
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Then, we (directly) construct D
(4)
n from C
(4)
n by attaching to the four states in bold
C2D(4)n = [ 1/M, 1/n ; −3/M, 1/n ; 3/M, 1/n ; −1/M, 1/n ].
This yields D
(4)
n given by
D(4)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1 + 1/M,1/n ; xj+2 − 3/M,1/n ; xj+3 + 3/M,1/n ; xj+4 − 1/M,1/n ;
xj+5, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ].
Clearly, C
(4)
n and D
(4)
n occur as a subclass of C(4) and D(4). To see this, consider an
initial lottery L
(4)
n given by
L(4)n = [ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1 + 1/(2M),1/n ; xj+2 − 3/(2M),1/n ; xj+3 + 3/(2M),1/n ;
xj+4 − 1/(2M),1/n ; xj+5, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ],
and generate D
(4)
n (C
(4)
n ) by attaching the good (bad), G(4) (B(4)), given by
G(4) = [ 1/(2M), 1/n ; −1/M, 1/n ; 1/(2M), 1/n ] and
B(4) = [ −1/(2M), 1/n ; 1/M, 1/n ; −1/(2M), 1/n ],
to the first three bold states of L
(4)
n , and attaching the bad (good), B(4) (G(4)), to the
last three bold states of L
(4)
n . To keep the required number of states as small as possible
and enhance parsimony, sufficient for our purpose of signing h′′′′, we again conduct
transformations at overlapping states, just like in Section 6.1 and Section 3.
The following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class of
lottery pairs D
(4)
n and C
(4)
n signs h′′′′:
Theorem 6.4 If, for any n ≥ 4, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) D(4)n to C(4)n , then h′′′′ ≤ 0
(h′′′′ ≥ 0).
6.3 The mth Order
In this section, we systematically construct simple nested classes of lottery pairs such
that the direction of preference between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the
mth derivative of the probability weighting function under DT. We start at the second
order and proceed to construct all higher orders of dual risk apportionment by simple
iteration, as follows. Consider
G(2) = [ δ, 1/n ] and B(2) = [ −δ′, 1/n ],
with δ, δ′ ≥ 0. Taking the (m− 1)th order as a starting point, we construct the class of
lottery pairs for the mth order in two steps. Let n ≥ m. Then:
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(i) Concatenate a same-sized but exactly opposite G(m−1) and B(m−1), with G(m−1)
state-wise preceding B(m−1) by at least one state. This generates G(m). Simi-
larly, concatenate another same-sized but exactly opposite G(m−1) and B(m−1), with
B(m−1) state-wise preceding G(m−1) by at least one state. This generates B(m).
(ii) Attach G(m) and B(m) to an arbitrarily given n-state initial lottery. We generate
D(m) if G(m) state-wise precedes B(m) and we generate C(m) if B(m) state-wise
precedes G(m).
In the transformations to D(m) and C(m) we require that the ranking of outcomes remains
unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative.
Then, we state the following theorem:
Theorem 6.5 Let m ≥ 2. If C(m) and D(m) are generated by the transformations
described above, then D(m) is preferred (dispreferred) to C(m) by any DT DM with
(−1)m−1h(m) ≥ 0 ((−1)m−1h(m) ≤ 0).
Just like in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 we consider henceforth parsimonious subclasses of
lottery pairs C(m) and D(m) that are already sufficient for signing h(m). We start at the
second order and proceed by simple iteration. Let n ≥ m ≥ 2 and consider
C(m)n =[ x1, 1/n ; . . . ; xj, 1/n ;
xj+1,1/n ; . . . ; xj+m,1/n ;
xj+m+1, 1/n; . . . ; ., 1/n ].
The m states in bold need to be present for any n(≥ m), the remaining states are added
arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the outcomes
when moving to an adjacent higher state of C
(m)
n are allowed to be arbitrarily non-
negative and state-dependent, as long as the transformations conducted below do not
change the ranking of outcomes. Taking the (m − 1)th order as a starting point, we
construct the class of lottery pairs for the mth order in two steps:
(i) Concatenate a same-sized but exactly opposite G(m−1) and B(m−1), with G(m−1)
state-wise preceding B(m−1) by exactly one state. This generates G(m). Next,
concatenate the same G(m−1) and B(m−1) with B(m−1) state-wise preceding G(m−1)
by exactly one state. This generates B(m). (For m = 2, we set G(2) = [ δ, 1/n ] and
B(2) = [ −δ, 1/n ], δ > 0.)
(ii) Generate D
(m)
n by attaching G(m) to the first (m − 1) bold states of C(m)n and
attaching B(m) to the last (m− 1) bold states of C(m)n .
In the transformations from C
(m)
n to D
(m)
n we require that the ranking of outcomes
remains unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative. For
m ≥ 3, we perform our sequences of squeezes and anti-squeezes at overlapping states
to keep the required number of states minimal. This yields a parsimonious approach
already sufficient for signing h(m).
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Finally, the following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class
of lottery pairs D
(m)
n and C
(m)
n signs h(m):
Theorem 6.6 Let m ≥ 2. If, for any n ≥ m, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) D(m)n to
C
(m)
n , then (−1)m−1h(m) ≥ 0 ((−1)m−1h(m) ≤ 0).
7 Conclusion
Starting with Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980), many papers have been devoted to an
interpretation of the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility function within the
EU model.
In this paper we have developed a model free story of preferences towards particular
nested classes of lottery pairs that is appropriate to satisfy the specific requirements of
the DT model. The story yields an intuitive interpretation, and full characterization, of
the dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence and temperance. The direction of
preference between the nested lottery pairs that are provided by the story is equivalent
to signing the mth derivative of the probability weighting function within DT.
We have analyzed implications of our results for portfolio choice, which appear to
stand in sharp contrast to familiar implications under the EU model. We have also
shown that, where the sign of the third derivative of the utility function is connected to
a savings problem, the sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function
may be naturally linked to a self-protection problem.
Because the primal and dual stories have several aspects in common, some of the
implications of the primal story can potentially be extended to a dual world. For instance,
because it is also simple, the dual story should be as amenable to experimentation as
the primal story. Another promising route for future research is that the dual story can
serve as a building block on the basis of which it should be possible to obtain related
interpretations for more general models of choice under risk (and ambiguity). Indeed,
now that the dual story has been told, future research can develop an interpretation to
the signs of the successive derivatives of both the utility function and the probability
weighting function in the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model of Quiggin (1982) and
in prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For example, one may verify
that the direction of preference between the intersection of lottery pairs generated by
primal and dual risk apportionment signs the successive derivatives of the utility and
probability weighting functions jointly under RDU. This would provide a test for the
null hypothesis that both U (3) ≥ 0 and h(3) ≥ 0 in the RDU environment, as is often
assumed in parametric specifications of the utility and probability weighting functions.
Furthermore, subsets of lottery pairs generated by dual risk apportionment that share the
same final wealth outcomes can be used to test the null hypothesis that (only) h(3) ≥ 0
in the RDU setting.
As such, this paper represents a first step, and paves new ways, towards the devel-
opment of higher order risk attitudes in non-EU theories, as explicitly desired by Deck
and Schlesinger (2010).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We first note that the probabilities of generating the minimal
outcome in a two-shot experiment (i.e., in two independent draws) for the states of an
arbitrarily given n-state lottery A with equal state probabilities are
(2n− 1)/n2, . . . , 7/n2, 5/n2, 3/n2, 1/n2,
respectively. Thus, the second dual moment of A is given by
E [min(A1, A2)] = (1/n
2)xn+(3/n
2)xn−1+(5/n2)xn−2+(7/n2)xn−3+· · ·+((2n−1)/n2)x1.
Hence, one readily verifies that
E
[
C(3)
]
= E
[
D(3)
]
,
E
[
min(C
(3)
1 , C
(3)
2 )
]
= E
[
min(D
(3)
1 , D
(3)
2 )
]
.
Indeed, attaching G(3) and B(3) with G(3) state-wise preceding B(3) versus attaching B(3)
and G(3) with B(3) state-wise preceding G(3) has the same (incremental) impact on the
dual moments up to the second order. Furthermore, FC(3) surpasses FD(3) before crossing
twice, so that D(3) dominates C(3) in third-degree dual stochastic dominance; see e.g.,
Proposition 4.9 of Wang and Young (1998).
It then follows from a Taylor expansion of the “dual utility premium”,
V
[
D(3)
]− V [C(3)] ,
(see Theorem 4.4 of Wang and Young (1998)) that when the dual moments are equal
up to the second order, h′′′ ≥ 0 (h′′′ ≤ 0) implies that the dual utility premium above is
non-negative (non-positive). This proves the stated result. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Since h′′ is differentiable on (0, 1), the third derivative of h being
non-negative is equivalent to requiring that
([h(p+)− h(p0)]− [h(p0)− h(p−)])− ([h(p0)− h(p−)]− [h(p−)− h(p−−)])
= h(p+)− 3h(p0) + 3h(p−)− h(p−−) ≥ 0,
for any four equidistant probabilities 0 ≤ p−− ≤ p− ≤ p0 ≤ p+ ≤ 1. We will show that
this condition is satisfied whenever D
(3)
n is preferred to C
(3)
n for any n ≥ 3 within DT.
(The implication h′′′ ≤ 0 follows similarly.)
We note that the DT evaluation of a lottery A with n outcomes x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤
xn is given by
V [A] =
∫ ∞
0
x d
(
1− h¯(1− FA(x))
)
= −
n∑
i=1
xi
(
h¯(1− FA(xi))− h¯(1− FA(xi−1))
)
=
∫ ∞
0
h¯(1− FA(x)) dx =
n∑
i=1
h¯(1− FA(xi−1))(xi − xi−1),
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with h¯(p) = 1 − h(1 − p). Observe that h¯ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with h¯(0) = 0, h¯(1) = 1,
h¯′ ≥ 0; and that h¯′′ ≥ 0 is equivalent to h′′ ≤ 0. Here, FA(x0) = 0 by convention, so
1− FA(x0) = h¯(1− FA(x0)) = 1. Hence,
V [C(3)n ] =
j∑
i=1
h¯(1− F
C
(3)
n
(xi−1))(xi − xi−1) +
j+4∑
i=j+1
h¯(1− F
C
(3)
n
(xi−1))(xi − xi−1)
+
n∑
i=j+5
h¯(1− F
C
(3)
n
(xi−1))(xi − xi−1)
= : ΣC
(3)
n
1 + Σ
C
(3)
n
2 + Σ
C
(3)
n
3 ,
with j corresponding to the state preceding the three states in bold that are always
present in C
(3)
n , and similarly for D
(3)
n . Notice that
ΣC
(3)
n
1 = Σ
D
(3)
n
1 , Σ
C
(3)
n
3 = Σ
D
(3)
n
3 .
Furthermore,
ΣC
(3)
n
2 = (xj+1 − xj)h¯(1− F (xj)) + (xj+2 − xj+1)h¯(1− F (xj+1))
+ (xj+3 − xj+2)h¯(1− F (xj+2)) + (xj+4 − xj+3)h¯(1− F (xj+3)),
and
ΣD
(3)
n
2 = (xj+1 − xj + 1/M)h¯(1− F (xj)) + (xj+2 − xj+1 − 3/M)h¯(1− F (xj+1))
+ (xj+3 − xj+2 + 3/M)h¯(1− F (xj+2)) + (xj+4 − xj+3 − 1/M)h¯(1− F (xj+3)),
suppressing the indices C
(3)
n and D
(3)
n for convenience. Define, for given n ≥ 3, the
probability q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1− 3/n, such that
F (xj) = q, F (xj+1) = q + 1/n, F (xj+2) = q + 2/n,
F (xj+3) = q + 3/n, F (xj+4) = q + 4/n.
Then,
ΣC
(3)
n
2 = (xj+1 − xj)h¯(1− q) + (xj+2 − xj+1)h¯(1− q − 1/n)
+ (xj+3 − xj+2)h¯(1− q − 2/n) + (xj+4 − xj+3)h¯(1− q − 3/n),
and
ΣD
(3)
n
2 = (xj+1 − xj + 1/M)h¯(1− q) + (xj+2 − xj+1 − 3/M)h¯(1− q − 1/n)
+ (xj+3 − xj+2 + 3/M)h¯(1− q − 2/n) + (xj+4 − xj+3 − 1/M)h¯(1− q − 3/n).
Upon defining p−−, p−, p0, p+ such that
3/n ≤ 1− q = p+ ≤ 1, 1− q − 1/n = p0,
1− q − 2/n = p−, 1− q − 3/n = p−−,
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it then follows from the arbitrariness of n ≥ 3, hence the arbitrariness of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1−3/n,
that
ΣD
(3)
n
2 − ΣC
(3)
n
2 = (1/M)h¯(p+)− (3/M)h¯(p0) + (3/M)h¯(p−)− (1/M)h¯(p−−) ≥ 0,
for any four equidistant probabilities 0 ≤ p−− ≤ p− ≤ p0 ≤ p+ ≤ 1, whenever D(3)n is
preferred to C
(3)
n for any n ≥ 3. We note that ΣD
(3)
n
2 − ΣC
(3)
n
2 is the DT analog of the
utility premium in the EU model. Finally, observe that h¯′′′ ≥ 0 is equivalent to h′′′ ≥ 0.
This proves the stated result. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.3. By analogy to the proof of Theorem 6.1, we first note that the
probabilities of generating the minimal outcome in a three-shot experiment (that is, in
three independent draws) for the states of an arbitrarily given n-state lottery A with
equal state probabilities are
(3(n− 1)n+ 1)/n3, . . . , 37/n3, 19/n3, 7/n3, 1/n3,
respectively. Thus, the third dual moment of A is given by
E [min(A1, A2, A3)] = (1/n
3)xn + (7/n
3)xn−1 + (19/n3)xn−2 + (37/n3)xn−3
+ · · ·+ ((3(n− 1)n+ 1)/n3)x1.
Hence, one may verify that not only the first two dual moments of C(4) and D(4) are
equal, but also the third:
E
[
min(C
(4)
1 , C
(4)
2 , C
(4)
3 )
]
= E
[
min(D
(4)
1 , D
(4)
2 , D
(4)
3 )
]
.
Indeed, attaching G(4) and B(4) with G(4) state-wise preceding B(4) versus attaching B(4)
and G(4) with B(4) state-wise preceding G(4) has the same (incremental) impact on the
dual moments up to the third order. The proof then follows by similar arguments as the
proof of Theorem 6.1. The details are suppressed to save space. They are contained in
the extended online version. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.4. The proof follows by similar arguments as the proof of Theorem
6.2. The details are suppressed to save space. They are contained in the extended online
version. 2
Proof of Theorems 6.5 and 6.6. The proofs follow by similar arguments as the proofs of
Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 and Theorems 6.2 and 6.4, respectively. See the extended online
version for some further details. 2
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